STACK 

\NNBX 


27TH   DIVISION 

itory  of  Its  Sacrifices  and  Achievements 


ome 


ain! 


M.  tfflGEHS  -M.y. 


THE  STORY  OF 

ITS  SACRIFICES 

AND 

ACHIEVEMENTS 


Rti/i'shed 
JOHN   H.  EGGERS   CO.ntt. 


NEW  YORK. 


Copyright,  1919 

John  H.  Eggers 

New  York 


The  27th  Division 

The  Story  of 
.        Its    Sacrifices       ^ 

and 

Achievements 

INTRODUCTORY — SUCCESS  THROUGH   SACRIFICE 

Some  day  a  complete  history  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Divi- 
sion will  be  written.  It  will  necessarily  run  into  volumes  and 
volumes.  On  its  purely  human  side  the  acts  of  valor  performed 
by  individual  soldiers  are  so  numerous  that  a  record  of  them 
alone  would  fill  thousands  of  pages.  On  its  military  side,  the 
intricacies  of  modern  warfare  will  necessitate  lengthy  accounts 
of  the  actions  in  which  the  Twenty-Seventh  engaged  from 
July  9th,  1918  up  to  the  signing  of  the  armistice. 

After  all,  from  the  historical  standpoint  any  one  battle  is 
only  a  dramatic  episode.  The  newspapers  have  told  us  of  the 
accomplishments  of  the  Twenty-Seventh.  Its  success  in  pene- 
trating the  Hindenburg  Line  is  now  history.  The  newspapers 
have  all  touched  on  the  enormous  losses  incurred  in  that  battle. 

This  sketch,  based  on  reports  of  Major  General  O'Ryan, 
now  in  the  archives  of  the  Division  and  not  heretofore  made 
public,  is  a  summing  up  of  the  Twenty-Seventh's  achievements, 
written  with  the  special  purpose  of  emphasing  the  sacrificial 
nature  of  its  participation  in  the  war.  It  is  a  record  of  objec- 
tives maintained,  of  positions  held,  of  bravery  and  of  victory, 
but  more  than  all  it  is  a  memorial  to  those  who  died — to  those 
who  knew  so  well  how  to  die. 

BEGINNING  THE   ATTACK 

Rather  than  follow  a  chronological  order,  we  will  begin  with 
the  breaking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  which  is  the  outstanding 
feature  in  any  story  of  the  Twenty-Seventh.  The  battle  of 
the  breaking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line  typifies  sacrifice.  It 

(3) 


2061947 


4  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27TH  DIVISION 

typifies  success  won  through  sacrifice.  All  observers  are 
agreed  that  in  the  breaking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line  the 
Twenty-Seventh  had  to  go  through  a  veritable  Inferno.  The 
experiences  of  the  six  hundred  in  the  famous  Charge  of  the 
Light  Brigade,  made  immortal  by  Tennyson,  pale  into  insignifi- 
cance when  compared  with  the  advance  of  the  Twenty-Seventh 
across  "No  Man's  Land"  into  a  maelstrom  of  steel  and  fire  and 
hate. 

It  began  very  early  on  that  fateful  morning — the  27th 
of  September.  The  day  is  breaking  but  it  is  quite  dark.  The 
sun  is  still  below  the  horizon.  Stretched  out  along  a  white  tape 
line  for  a  distance  of  about  4000  yards,  some  eighteen  hundred 
men  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division  are  standing  waiting  for 
the  moment  to  advance.  Though  it  is  September,  the  morning 
is  cold.  The  clouds  hang  low  and  the  mist  is  heavy.  It  is  unusu- 
ally quiet,  the  silence  being  only  broken  by  the  occasional 
intermittent  distant  fire  which  characterizes  battle  fronts 
during  periods  of  so-called  inactivity.  It  is  a  solemn  moment. 
Every  one  knows  that  serious  business  is  ahead.  The  men 
themselves  are  generally  silent.  It  is  a  period  of  waiting  and 
each  man  knows  that  it  is  only  a  matter  of  moments  when  the 
forward  movement  will  begin.  . 

Suddenly  all  is  changed.  The  moment  for  the  advance  ar- 
rives. The  barrage  starts  promptly  at  the  zero  hour.  Just 
as  dawn  is  breaking,  the  gun  on  the  extreme  right  fires  as  a 
signal:  a  mighty  roar  follows  as  the  other  guns  open  up  all 
along  the  line  and  various  colored  lights  and  rockets  are  seen 
going  up  from  the  Bodies'  line — his  S.  O.  S.  signals  calling 
for  a  counter-barrage  to  protect  him  from  the  advancing  Amer- 
icans. Our  aeroplanes  now  appear  overhead.  The  eighteen 
hundred  grim,  determined,  upstanding  men  on  the  front  line 
simultaneously  begin  a  forward  movement,  each  man  with 
bayonet  fixed  and  about  six  feet  from  his  neighbor  and  turn- 
ing neither  to  the  right  nor  to  the  left. 

The  noise  from  the  light  and  heavy  guns  of  the  British,  who 
are  supporting  our  men  is  terrific.  It  is  still  dark  enough  to 
make  the  flashes  from  exploding  shells  visible.  The  men  are 
immediately  conscious  that  the  Boche  has  only  had  one  eye 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  5 

shut  during  the  night.  Now  comes  the  most  ominous  thing  of 
all.  The  sickening,  whirring  whine  of  machine-gun  bullets 
is  added  to  the  din.  There  is  no  sound  in  the  world  like  it: 
with  it  comes  death  and  wounds  on  every  side. 

It  would  seem  that  the  enemy  in  this  particular  engagement 
knew  almost  as  if  by  instinct  when  the  attack  would  begin, 
for  in  a  great  many  instances  men  and  officers  were  killed 
apparently  before  they  had  had  time  to  take  a  step.  Day  was 
breaking  and  those  in  the  rear  of  the  advancing  column  had 
evidences  of  the  deadliness  of  the  conflict.  Wounded  came 
streaming  down  the  roads  from  all  organizations  in  the  line. 
A  little  later  in  the  morning  some  of  the  roads  were  choked 
with  litter  cases,  with  walking  wounded  and  litter  bearers  and 
stragglers. 

"KILL,  OR  BE  KILLED" 

The  reader  must  keep  in  mind  that  particularly  in  the  last 
phases  of  the  war,  an  attack  like  that  in  which  the  Twenty- 
Seventh  took  part  depended  for  success  always  on  the  actions 
of  the  survivors.  For  weeks  these  men  of  the  Twenty-Seventh 
who  went  over  the  top,  as  we  are  describing,  had  been  taught 
that  a  position  once  captured  must  never  be  lost.  They  had 
been  trained  into  the  theory  that  killing  and  being  killed  was 
part  of  the  game;  that  the  bayonetting  of  a  Boche  had  no  rela- 
tion to  the  saving  of  a  man's  own  life  for  his  own  sake,  but 
only  for  the  sake  of  the  objective.  The  attack  was  undertaken 
with  a  fixed  determination  to  carry  it  through  to  success.  One 
can  never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  after  the  beginning  of  an 
attack  there  is  only  one  thing  to  do,  and  that  is  to  go  forward. 

A  brief  outline  showing  the  position  of  the  Twenty-Seventh 
Division  and  the  objects  of  its  initial  attack  on  September  27th 
will  help  to  give  an  idea  of  the  ultimate  aim.  On  September 
25th,  two  days  before  the  attack,  the  Division  took  over  the 
sector  lying  directly  opposite  that  portion  of  the  Hindenburg 
Line  which  began  at  Vendhuille  and  extended  to  a  point  a  little 
north  of  Bellicourt.  Just  beyond  the  Hindenburg  Line  on  this 
sector  and  running  nearly  parallel  to  it  is  the  St.  Quentin  canal 
tunnel,  which  is  6000  yards  long,  built  by  Napoleon  in  1811, 


6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  2/TH  DIVISION 

which  will  be  described  more  fully  in  a  subsequent  paragraph. 
Lying  between  the  Hindenburg  Line  and  trenches  occupied  by 
the  Twenty-Seventh  Division,  the  Germans  held  several  out- 
post positions  which  were  strongly  fortified. 

The  situation  is  aptly  described  by  the  following  quotation 
from  official  reports  concerning  the  Twenty-Seventh,  after 
taking  over  the  sector  in  question: 

"Since  we  again  approach  the  Hindenburg  Line  activity  and 
work  on  (enemy)  trenches  is  visible,  especially  at  Bony  and 
Bellicourt.  In  general  the  Hindenburg  Line  was  ready  before, 
and  remained  in  good  condition;  the  wire  is  excellent.  Little 
or  no  work  has  been  recently  done  on  back  lines  behind  the 
Hindenburg  Line.  For  example  the  Catelet-Nauroy-Magny 
Line  is  a  single  trench  with  dugouts,  not  very  heavily  wired. 

THREE    STRONG   OUTPOSTS 

"On  the  other  hand  the  enemy  evidently  did  not  wish  us  to 
approach  too  near  to  the  Hindenburg  Line,  and  he  did  a  good 
deal  of  work  on  various  outpost  lines,  for  example  Guillemont 
and  the  Quennemont  Farms.  In  particular  the  Fresnoy- 
Fayette  Ridge  was  strongly  organized  with  new  trenches  and 
considerable  belts  of  wire." 

These  facts  had  been  learned  by  airplane  observers  and 
patrols.  The  report  then  goes  on  to  say: 

"An  attack  on  the  main  Hindenburg  Line  being  contem- 
plated, it  was  decided  by  the  army  that  a  preliminary  opera- 
tion was  necessary  in  order  to  occupy  the  outer  line  of  defenses 
including  the  three  strong  points  of  the  Knoll,  Guillemont  and 
Quennemont  Farms  from  which  to  launch  the  main  attack. 

"The  line  taken  over  by  the  Thirtieth  Division  on  our  right 
was  further  advanced  than  ours  and  included  much  of  the 
outer  line  of  defenses;  the  line  held  by  the  British  Twelfth 
Division  on  our  left  dropped  back  in  a  northwesterly  direc- 
tion, giving  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division  little  support  and 
leaving  Vendhuille  (strongly  occupied)  free  to  threaten  the 
left  of  any  advance  made  by  this  Division." 

Accordingly,  Field  Order  Number  47,  Twenty-Seventh 
Division,  was  issued  designating  the  following  troops  for  at- 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  7 

tack:  Fifty-third  Infantry  Brigade,  One  Hundred  Fourth 
Machine  Gun  Battalion,  One  Hundred  Sixth  Machine  Gun 
Battalion,  twelve  tanks  of  the  Fourth  Tank  Brigade,  nine 
brigades  of  Field  Artillery  British,  Detachment  of  One  Hun- 
dred Second  Engineers,  Detachment  of  One  Hundred  Second 
Field  Battalion.  These  to  be  assisted  by  Heavy  Artillery. 

The  instructions  also  showed  that  the  attack  was  to  be  car- 
ried out  by  the  One  Hundred  Sixth  Infantry,  three  Battalions, 
side  by  side,  disposed  in  depth;  that  our  troops  had  as  their 
objective  the  occupations  of  the  rearmost  trenches  of  the  outer 
line  of  the  Hindenburg  system,  which  was  a  distance  of  about 
noo  yards  from  the  lines  occupied  by  our  troops. 

"THE  MEN  MUST  GO  FORWARD" 

A  very  clear  idea  of  what  was  expected  as  the  result  of  this 
attack  can  be  gotten  by  reading  the  instructions  which  were 
made  to  the  One  Hundred  Sixth  Infantry.  It  should  be  noted 
that  the  keynote  of  these  instructions  was:  "The  men  must  go 
forward."  The  order  follows: 

"The  One  Hundred  Sixth  Infantry  will  attack  in  the  sector 
indicated  as  the  front  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division;  that 
is  to  say,  from  the  black  line  on  the  map  which  indicates  ap- 
proximately the  present  front  line  of  the  British  in  that  sector. 
The  attack  of  the  One  Hundred  Sixth  Infantry  will  be  sup- 
ported by  tanks  and  a  rolling  barrage.  The  men  will  be  in- 
formed that  they  are  not  to  depend  upon  the  tanks.  The 
tanks  will  be  present  simply  to  give  such  assistance  as  they  can. 
No  matter  what  happens  to  the  tanks,  the  men  must  go  forward. 
The  tanks  will  return  immediately  the  objective  is  gained.  It 
is  most  essential  that  this  be  impressed  upon  the  men. 

"The  front  of  the  attack  is  roughly  4000  yards.  The  objec- 
tive is  shown  by  the  dotted  red  line  on  the  accompanying  map. 
The  ground  to  be  taken  therefore  varies  in  depth  from  500  yards 
to  1500  yards.  At  the  outset  it  is  essential  that  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  study  the  maps  furnished  them  with 
particular  reference  to  the  contours.  During  this  it  will  be 
noted  that  the  country  to  be  operated  over  is  hilly  and  that 
these  hills,  as  well  as  the  roads  and  villages,  form  prominent 


8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27™  DIVISION 

landmarks  which  will  serve  as  ready  references,  thus  making 
it  simple  for  all  to  locate  themselves,  move  in  the  right  direc- 
tion and  correctly  report  their  positions. 

"All  should  particularly  note  the  three  ridges,  all  running 
northeasterly  to  the  objective  line,  one  being  on  the  north  end 
of  our  line,  one  in  the  center  and  one  near  the  south  end  of  our 
line.  These  three  ridges  with  the  valleys  between  them,  form 
excellent  landmarks. 

"In  this  operation  the  regiment  will  attack  with  all  three 
battalions  in  line  disposed  in  depth,  and  upon  reaching  its 
objective  will  consolidate  in  that  manner.  The  leading  ele- 
ments will  follow  the  barrage  as  closely  as  -possible.  It  is  essential 
to  explain  to  the  men  the  importance  of  this.  This  explanation 
will  be  made  by  captains  and  by  platoon  commanders  as  well. 

"As  the  barrage  clears  enemy  points  of  resistance  during  the 
advance,  the  leading  elements  will  go  through  them  without 
hesitation,  for  they  must  not  lose  ground  behind  the  barrage. 
Assure  the  men  that  enemy  soldiers  in  such  places  will  surren- 
der, but  that  whether  they  do  or  not  the  leading  elements  must 
go  on,  leaving  to  the  mopping  up  parties  in  the  rear  the  task  of 
dealing  with  them.  Mopping  up  parties  will  see  that  prisoners 
are  disarmed  and  sent  to  the  rear.  Nominal  guards  only  will 
be  necessary.  Prisoners  will  be  taken  over  by  the  Military 
Police. 

"No  matter  what  the  success,  or  no  matter  what  induce- 
ments are  offered,  this  attack  of  the  One  Hundred  Sixth 
Infantry  will  not  proceed  beyond  the  objective  indicated. 
The  objective  line  will  be  consolidated  with  all  speed  and 
greatest  thoroughness.  Impress  this  on  the  men,  for  the  enemy 
will  undoubtedly  counter-attack.  Having  taken  the  objective, 
or  secured  the  greatest  advance  practicable,  every  attention 
will  be  given  to  the  preparation  of  the  position  to  repulse  coun- 
ter-attack. 

"THE  LINE  MUST  BE  HELD" 

"Careful  supervision  will  be  given  by  officers  of  the  regiment 
to  the  placing  of  machine  guns  and  Lewis  guns  when  the  line 
is  consolidated  so  that  the  best  fields  of  fire  may  be  obtained. 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  9 

All  ranks  should  be  informed  that  heavy  shelling  and  counter- 
attacks will  not  be  considered  as  reasons  for  withdrawal.  The 
line  must  be  held  irrespective  of  casualties  or  weather  condi- 
tions. The  job  is  a  matter  of  fast  and  deep  digging  and  the 
maintenance  of  good  fields  of  fire. 

"Our  men  should  be  informed  that  British  contact  planes 
will  fly  over  them  sounding  the  letter  'A*  of  the  Morse  alphabet 
on  the  Klaxon  horn.  The  letter  'A'  is  indicated  by  a  short  and 
long  blast  of  the  Klaxon.  This  signal  is  the  demand  for  the 
men  of  the  front  line  to  show  its  flares  and  flash  its  tin  discs  so 
that  the  aviator  may  locate  and  report  the  location  of  the  front 
line.  Men  in  the  support  lines  should  not  give  these  signals  as 
such  action  would  only  serve  to  mislead  the  aviator. 

"Officers  of  the  regiment  will  see  to  it  that  all  ranks  of  the 
regiment  are  provided  with  pieces  of  tin  to  be  issued  and 
sewed  on  the  inside  of  the  respirator  flap  for  use  in  signalling 
to  the  contact  aeroplanes  as  prescribed.  The  men  will  be 
cautioned  not  to  fire  on  aeroplanes  showing  the  British  in- 
signia. We  are  assured  that  no  authentic  case  is  recorded 
where  an  enemy  aeroplane  has  carried  Allied  insignia. 

"All  officers  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  insuring  the  posses- 
sion and  readiness  for  use  in  each  company  of  rifle  grenades, 
rockets  and  flares,  and  message  rockets  for  the  purpose  of 
sending  back  messages. 

"The  men  will  be  warned  to  keep  themselves  fit  by  getting 
all  the  sleep  they  can  before  the  commencement  of  the  attack. 
Company  and  platoon  commanders,  if  necessary,  should 
literally  put  their  men  to  bed  as  nothing  makes  greater  drain 
upon  physical  fitness  than  lack  of  sleep.  The  greatest  atten- 
tion should  be  given  the  matter  of  food  and  every  attention 
given  to  getting  up  hot  food  to  the  men  in  the  front." 

When  it  is  recalled  that  in  this  preliminary  engagement 
practically  no  prisoners  were  taken  on  either  side,  that  the 
supreme  rule  was  kill  or  be  killed,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that 
before  going  into  action  the  men  of  the  Hundred  and  Sixth 
were  given  this  warning,  "No  man  must  be  taken  as  a  prisoner 
but  must  fight  to  a  finish." 

Though  the  Commander  of  the  Division  felt  confident  that 


10 

the  "No  prisoner  rule"  would  prevail,  he  foresaw  a  possible 
capture  of  an  occasional  man  in  some  unforeseen  circumstance 
and  gave  the  following  instructions:  "If  by  any  chance  a  man 
should  be  taken  prisoner,  he  will  give  only  such  information 
as  will  lead  the  enemy  to  believe  that  the  rest  of  the  Division 
to  which  he  was  attached  was  going  South." 

WHAT  A   PRISONER  MIGHT  TELL 

Every  man  had  rehearsed  before  going  into  action  the  state- 
ment that  he  expected  to  make  in  the  rare  instance  of  his  being 
made  a  prisoner.  "I  left  my  billet  in  a  rear  area  two  or  three 
days  before"  was  all  the  prisoner  expected  to  say,  except  that 
he  had  heard  that  the  rest  of  the  Division  was  going  South. 
How  far  South  he  did  not  know,  but  believed  the  move  was 
made  by  rail.  Since  that  time  he  had  seen  no  other  unit  of 
his  Division  in  this  area,  but  British  troops  only. 

Shortly  after  the  advance  began,  the  rain,  the  everlasting 
rain  that  characterized  the  righting  in  Northern  France, 
added  to  the  hazard  of  battle.  At  six  forty-five,  a  little  more 
than  an  hour  after  the  men  left  the  "jumping-offline"at  dawn, 
a  telegram  was  received  at  Division  Headquarters  from  the 
Fifty-Third  Infantry  Brigade  reporting  that  a  success  signal 
had  been  sent  up  by  the  left  battalion.  But  in  the  next  four 
hours  the  Boche  machine  gunners  before  being  killed  took  a 
terrible  toll  of  our  dead  and  wounded.  At  ten  forty  many 
companies  were  entirely  without  officers. 

At  noon  the  three  big  outposts  of  the  enemy,  the  Knoll, 
Guillemont  Farm,  and  Quennemont  Farm  still  remained  to 
be  taken. 

One  of  the  disappointments  was  the  failure  of  the  tanks. 

Four  tanks  were  assigned  to  reach  each  battalion  subsector, 
these  to  advance  with  the  first  line  and  one  to  follow  in  support 
loaded  with  wire  and  tools  for  consolidating  the  new  position. 
The  tanks  with  the  right  battalion  failed  to  get  into  action. 
A  few  tanks  in  each  of  the  other  sectors  accompanied  the  troops 
to  the  objective,  moved  around  Guillemont  Farm  and  the 
Knoll  and  then  returned.  Only  one  supply  tank  succeeded  in 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  u 

getting  forward  and  dumped  its  load.    On  the  whole  the  tanks 
were  not  of  much  assistance. 

Officers'  diaries  indicate  in  short  forceful  sentences  the 
terrific  character  of  the  fighting  and  the  stubborn  resistance  of 
the  enemy.  First  line  companies  got  well  into  the  trenches  in 
places  but  in  others  reached  only  the  barbed  wire  area.  While 
we  gained  a  foothold  in  the  three  strong  outposts  we  were  not 
sufficiently  strong  to  drive  out  their  defenders.  The  Boche 
machine  gunners  in  the  rear  gradually  forced  our  line  to  with- 
draw but  not  until  after  an  all  day  fight  in  which  the  loss  of 
officers  with  our  companies  made  itself  felt  in  depriving  the 
units  of  leaders. 

OUR  LOSSES    ENORMOUS 

An  extent  of  the  losses  in  this  engagement  can  be  gleaned 
from  the  following  quotation  from  the  official  report: 

"On  the  night  previous  to  the  operation  the  First  Battalion 
of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Infantry  reported  six  officers 
and  four  hundred  and  ninety-one  men  present  for  all  duty. 
On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth  it  reported  four  officers 
and  one  hundred  and  ninety-eight  men." 

The  Second  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Infan- 
try reached  its  objective  and  the  tanks  circled  Guillemont 
Farm  but,  as  was  discovered  in  later  operations,  this  position 
was  strongly  held  by  the  enemy  with  many  dugouts  and  under- 
ground passages.  Boche  machine  guns  kept  appearing 
from  new  points.  Reports  received  about  noon  indicated 
that  the  enemy  still  occupied  the  Farm. 

The  fighting  around  the  Knoll — a  vital  strategic  point — was 
perhaps  the  most  sanguinary  in  this  initial  advance.  At  ten 
forty  in  the  morning  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Fifty- 
Third  Brigade  sent  a  message  to  Division  Headquarters  re- 
porting the  situation.  At  eleven  thirty  the  Commanding 
Officer  of  the  Third  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth 
Infantry  left  Battalion  Headquarters  to  reorganize  the  front 
line.  Shortly  after  noon  this  part  of  the  line  in  a  counter- 
attack was  driven  off  the  Knoll,  but  with  the  aid  of  artillery 
and  machine  guns  our  men  drove  the  Boche  back  to  Tombois 
trench  in  less  than  half  an  hour.  This  counter-attack  by  our 


12  THE  STORY  OF  THE  2yTH  DIVISION 

troops  in  the  attacking  line  was  assisted  by  the  arrival  of  Com-< 
pany  L,  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry,  one  platoon  of 
which  had  been  sent  forward  about  n  A.  M.  as  a  reinforce- 
ment followed  by  the  remainder  of  the  company  and  by 
Company  I.  At  4  P.  M.  Company  G,  One  Hundred  and 
Fifth  Infantry,  was  placed  in  support  about  400  yards  in  the 
rear.  Before  dark  the  Third  Battalion,  One  Hundred  and 
Fifth  Infantry,  took  up  position  in  the  original  front  line 
trenches  which  formed  the  "jumping-offline"  of  the  morning, 
as  they  were  out  of  touch  with  the  Third  Battalion,  One  Hun- 
dred and  Sixth  Infantry,  at  their  right. 

The  Third  Battalion,  One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Infantry  re- 
ported, previous  to  the  operation,  present  for  all  duty  (includ- 
ing rear  echelon)  12  officers  and  484  men,  and  on  the  morning 
of  September  29th,  4  officers  and  210  men  present  for  all  duty. 
Reports  to  the  location  of  front  line  were  conflicting  during 
the  latter  part  of  the  afternoon,  but  later  airplane  reports 
indicated  that  the  Knoll  was  still  in  possession  of  the  enemy. 

Subsequent  inspection  of  the  ground  fought  over  disclosed 
an  immense  number  of  enemy  dead. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th  of  September,  the  remnant  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Sixth,  which  had  borne  the  brunt  of  this 
terrible  day's  fighting,  were  relieved  by  the  One  Hundred  and 
Seventh  and  One  Hundred  and  Eighth  Infantry,  which  took 
possession  of  the  line  that  only  one  day  before  had  constituted 
the  outpost  position  of  the  enemy.  The  men  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Sixth,  tired,  spattered  with  mud,  stiff  and  lame, 
scratched  by  barbed  wire,  ofttimes  half  dazed  with  shell  shock, 
retired  to  the  rear  to  get  a  well-deserved  rest. 

On  the  next  day  (September  28th),  General  Haig  visited 
Division  Headquarters. 

General  O'Ryan's  report  regarding  the  activities  of  the  relief 
units  on  this  day  contained  the  following  information: 

"Officers  report  stiff  fighting  in  numerous  places.  The  enemy 
seems  to  have  reorganized  points  along  front.  The  Fifty- 
fourth  Infantry  Brigade  Regiments  were  patroling  the  front 
and  making  an  effort  to  connect  with  any  advance  parties  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Infantry  on  or  about  objective  line." 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  13 

BREAKING  THE  HINDENBURG  LINE 

We  come  now  to  the  big  attack  of  September  29th  and  3Oth, 
in  which  the  Hindenburg  Line  was  broken.  This  action  is 
officially  known  as  the  Battle  of  the  Hindenburg  Line.  The 
reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division 
fought  this  battle  in  co-operation  with  the  Thirtieth  American 
Division,  the  two  divisions  comprising  the  Second  American 
Corps,  with  the  Third  British  Corps,  Australian  Corps,  Ninth 
British  Corps,  with  other  British  troops  on  the  left,  and  the 
Tenth  French  Army  on  the  right.  The  enemy  troops  opposing 
were  the  Second  Guard  Division,  Two  Hundred  and  Thirty- 
second  Infantry  Division,  Fifty-fourth  Infantry  Division, 
One  Hundred  and  Eighty-Fifth  Infantry  Division,  One  Hun- 
dred and  Twenty-First  Infantry  Division  and  Seventy-Fifth 
Infantry  Division.  The  character  of  the  defenses  on  this  por- 
tion of  the  Hindenburg  Line  is  of  great  significance.  Docu- 
ments captured  during  the  battle  disclose  the  fact  that  the 
Germans  considered  this  particular  section  of  the  famous  Hin- 
denburg system  as  absolutely  impregnable.  These  documents 
show  that  pamphlets  had  been  printed  by  order  of  the  German 
High  Command  and  distributed  to  officers  and  men,  in  which 
it  was  said  that  no  matter  what  other  part  of  the  line  might 
fall  into  the  hands  of  Americans  or  the  Allied  Armies,  that  the 
part  of  the  line  adjacent  to  the  St.  Quentin  Canal  Tunnel 
could  never  be  taken.  The  Germans  regarded  it  as  the  French 
did  the  defenses  around  Verdun.  In  fact,  it  was  known  as  the 
"German  Verdun."  The  barbed  wire  entanglement  alone  was 
more  than  ordinarily  formidable.  One  of  the  most  important 
features  of  the  defenses  at  this  point  was  the  use  that  had  been 
made  of  the  tunnel  itself  as  an  adjunct  to  the  trenches  of  the 
Hindenburg  line  nearby. 

The  officers  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division  had  obtained 
a  very  accurate  description  of  the  tunnel  from  prisoners  who 
had  been  captured  by  patrols.  The  following  description  of 
the  tunnel  is  taken  from  the  official  report: 

DESCRIPTION  OF  FORTIFICATIONS 

"The  Bellicourt  Tunnel  runs  for  5^  kilometers  at  a  depth 
underground  varying  from  13  to  20  meters.  It  is  10  meters 


14  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27™  DIVISION 

wide  at  the  top,  by  18  meters  wide  at  the  water  level  and 
strongly  built  of  masonry.  A  tow  path  runs  all  along  the 
eastern  side  and  another  along  at  least  part  of  the  western 
side.  There  are  reported  to  be  air  holes  every  300  meters  and 
also  chambers  out  in  the  walls.  Early  in  1918  there  were 
twenty-five  barges  in  the  tunnel  north  of  the  Bellicourt  block 
which  were  used  as  billets.  According  to  recent  prisoners,  these 
barges  are  now  broken  up  or  sunk.  There  are  foot  bridges 
across  the  water  bed.  Prisoners  in  1917  stated  that  there 
were  from  four  to  five  approach  galleries  about  30  meters  apart 
with  entrances  30  to  40  steps  down  on  the  west  side  of  the  road. 
The  location  of  these  lateral  galleries  was  fixed  by  a  captured 
German  map.  Some  of  these  approaches  are  discernible  on 
photographs  taken  by  airplanes.  This  map  also  shows  three 
galleries  into  the  canal,  cutting  just  south  of  Riqueval  (See 
map).  In  addition,  another  prisoner  reports  another  exit  in 
the  cellar  of  a  villa  with  a  shaft  running  into  the  Bellicourt 
road.  These  galleries  are  confirmed  by  maps  and  by  a  pris- 
oner of  an  electrical  power  company,  whose  engine  room  was 
in  one  of  the  chambers  out  in  the  east  wall  of  the  tunnel  at 
Bellicourt.  According  to  prisoners'  statements  in  1917,  there 
were  15  underground  galleries  leading  from  the  Gouy-Belli- 
court  road  into  the  tunnel,  which  enabled  the  Boche  troops 
to  enter  or  leave  the  tunnel  unobserved.  As  far  as  can  be 
gathered  from  a  recent  prisoner,  he  emerged  from  one  of  these 
lateral  galleries  close  to  the  Gouy-Bellicourt  road.  There  is 
little  trace  of  such  exits  on  photographs,  as  they  are  camou- 
flaged with  brushwood,  according  to  the  prisoner's  statement. 
According  to  the  prisoner,  there  are  about  9  such  galleries 
from  the  tunnel  between  Bellicourt  and  Bony. 

"Apart  from  the  air  shafts  along  the  tunnel,  as  shown  on  the 
maps,  there  is  a  series  of  dugouts  out  into  the  eastern  bank  of 
a  long  spoil  heap  which  runs  above  the  ground  over  line  of  the 
tunnel.  It  does  not  seem  likely  that  these  dugouts  lead  down 
into  the  tunnel,  as  the  latter  is  15  to  20  meters  below.  It  is 
possible  that  there  are  also  galleries  leading  west  from  the 
tunnel  to  exits  in  the  dugouts  shown  along  the  Hindenburg 
support  line." 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  15 

The  tunnel  was  blocked  at  each  entrance.  These  blocks 
were  described  by  a  prisoner  as  being  of  thick,  ferro-concrete, 
containing  an  upper  chamber  over  the  waterway  with  a  plat- 
form. These  blocks  were  provided  with  slits  for  two  machine 
guns,  with  which  it  was  intended  to  sweep  the  tunnel  should 
the  American  or  Allied  forces  gain  an  entrance.  The  Boche 
also  had  a  machine  guq  nest  on  the  southwest  entry  of  the 
tunnel.  There  were  also  machine  gun  emplacements  on  the 
outside  of  the  blocks,  with  which  to  sweep  the  open  canal. 

The  big  attack  on  the  29th  contemplated  the  taking  of  the 
entire  series  of  trenches  of  the  Hindenburg  system  that  lay 
between  the  position  occupied  by  the  Twenty-Seventh  and  the 
tunnel  just  described.  The  attack  began  at  five  fifty  in  the 
morning.  The  reader  may  picture  a  situation  very  similar  to 
that  of  the  preliminary  attack  of  the  two  days  previous.  The 
same  ordeal  had  to  be  gone  through,  and  those  who  lived 
through  it  will  never  forget  it.  Dawn  was  just  breaking  and 
there  was  a  heavy  mist.  The  following  description  is  from  a 
soldier's  letter: 

A  SOLDIER'S  LETTER 

"I  could  see  our  own  infantry  advancing  in  wave  formation 
in  front  of  me,  and  over  the  hill  I  could  see  different  colored 
lights  and  rockets  going  up  from  Fritz's  lines.  It  was  still  a 
little  dark. 

"Suddenly  some  Fritzies  appeared  on  the  skyline  with  their 
hands  up.  They  were  some  that  had  possibly  been  surprised 
and  scared  by  our  barrage.  They  gave  up  immediately  and 
were  sent  to  the  rear  without  guard;  some  of  them  being  hit 
on  the  way.  The  advance  went  on  steadily. 

"Our  company  was  in  formation  of  squad  columns  by  pla- 
toons. The  men  lined  up  in  single  file  behind  the  corporals. 
They  were  advancing  calmly  and  steadily,  although  men  had 
already  started  to  drop.  I  know  I  had  no  sensation  of  fear 
whatever,  but  had  a  rapidly  rising  hatred  for  Fritz  and  a  desire 
to  get  at  him,  and  I  think  we  all  felt  the  same  way. 

"We  would  walk  about  fifty  or  sixty  yards  and  then  drop 
into  shell  holes  and  rest  for  a  minute  or  so  as  the  machine  gun 


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i8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  zyTH  DIVISION 


equipment  makes  a  very  heavy  load  for  the  men.  We  would 
get  our  bearings,  and  then  on  again  over  the  crest  of  the  hill; 
then  started  through  the  valley,  the  Germans  holding  the  hills 
on  both  sides  and  having  them  covered  with  machine  gun  nests. 
The  Fritzies  had  come  up  out  of  their  dugouts  now,  as  our  bar- 
rage was  far  ahead,  and  were  sending  a  perfect  hail  of  shots  at 
us  from  machine  guns  and  snipers. 

"As  we  advanced  we  could  see  the  tanks  ploughing  along 
ahead,  cutting  the  barbed  wire  and  firing  into  the  Germans. 
We  crossed  two  lines  of  German  trench,  which  had  been  hastily 
abandoned  and  were  strewn  with  German  equipment,  and  went 
on  toward  the  valley. 

"It  was  about  this  time  that  our  artillery  started  sending 
over  a  smoke  cloud,  intended  for  our  left  flank  to  screen  us 
from  the  Germans  there,  but  the  smoke  was  unfortunately 
blown  down  into  the  valley  and  bothered  us  a  lot. 

"We  kept  going  ahead  by  compass,  but  finally  had  to  stop 
and  wait  in  a  shell  hole  for  the  smoke  to  blow  over.  When  it 
finally  cleared,  I  was  with  a  sergeant  and  about  ten  men  from 
my  platoon;  we  couldn't  see  our  troops  anywhere. 

"We  advanced  a  little  further.  We  were  on  the  slope  on  the 
right  side  of  the  valley  and  ran  into  machine  gun  fire  from  all 
around  us,  so  we  went  into  shell  holes  again  until  we  could  get 
our  bearings. 

"Finally  I  went  out  ahead  with  another  man  to  try  and 
locate  our  troops,  but  all  we  could  see  were  Germans  on  three 
sides  of  us,  about  three  hundred  yards  away  in  some  places. 
They  started  sniping  at  us,  so  we  started  back  to  our  men. 

"There  was  a  knocked-out  tank  near  us  and  on  the  way  back 
we  met  an  officer  from  it  and  he  asked  us  to  come  up  and  help 
get  his  men  out  of  the  trouble.  They  were  in  a  shell  hole  near 
the  tank  and  were  under  heavy  fire  from  Fritz.  So  we  moved 
up  with  our  men  to  help  them." 

TANKS   PUT   OUT   OF   ACTION 

On  the  big  Hindenburg  attack  the  infantry  was  preceded 
by  26  British  tanks.  These  tanks  were  known  as  the  "Mark 
5  Star"  tanks,  which  are  the  heaviest  used  in  the  British 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  19 

Army.  They  were  mounted  with  small  cannon  and  6  machine 
guns  to  each  tank.  As  in  the  preliminary  action  the  tanks  were 
found  to  be  practically  useless,  and  almost  immediately  9  of 
the  tanks  were  put  out  of  action,  either  by  ground  mines  laid 
by  the  Boche  or  anti-tank  artillery. 

Our  forces  were  under  one  other  distinct  disadvantage  at  the 
outset.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Knoll,  Guillemont 
Farm  and  Quennemont  Farm  had  not  been  entirely  occupied 
by  our  troops.  In  this  action  the  barrage  started  on  a  line 
beyond  these  strong  points,  thereby  leaving  any  of  the  enemy 
occupying  this  line  free  to  go  into  action  at  once. 

It  had  not  been  found  that  any  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Sixth  Infantry  held  at  the  time  of  this  attack  any  of  the  posi- 
tion which  they  reached  for  a  time  in  the  attack  on  the  27th. 
The  original  plans  had  presumed  that  these  points  would  be 
held  prior  to  the  main  attack.  In  spite  of  this  machine  gun 
fire  our  men  made  a  swift  advance  and  the  first  line  trenches 
of  the  Hindenburg  system  from  Bony  to  Bellicourt  fell  into 
American  hands.  (See  map.) 

North  of  Bony,  however,  the  situation  was  extremely  trying. 
The  enemy  was  able  to  make  a  flank  movement  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Vendhuille,  where  the  American  trenches  and  the 
trenches  of  the  Hindenburg  system  actually  joined,  and  the 
enemy  was  able  to  enfilade  our  men  and  work  great  havoc. 

PROGRESS   OF   THE   ATTACK 

The  following  statements  from  reports  received  at  Division 
Headquarters  show  the  progress  of  the  attack: 

At  6:05  A.  M.,  a  few  minutes  after  the  attack  began,  a 
message  was  received  from  the  Fifty-Third  Infantry  Brigade 
saying  that  the  situation  seemed  quite  normal  for  an  hour  before 
the  attack,  although  previous  to  that  time  the  enemy  had 
seemed  nervous  and  displayed  some  extra  activity. 

At  6:21  A.  M.  a  telegram  read,  "Tanks  on  hand  and  One 
Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  got  off  to  good  start." 

At  8:04  A.  M.  Division  Headquarters  received  a  phone  mes- 
sage saying  that  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  up  till 
7:30  A.  M.  had  very  little  opposition,  that  the  retaliation  bar- 


2O  THE  STORY  OF  THE  2/TH  DIVISION 

rage  was  light  and  well  back  of  our  troops,  and  that  a  wounded 
officer  reported  31  prisoners.  One  of  the  prisoners  told  us  the 
attack  was  a  surprise. 

A  telephone  message  received  from  the  One  Hundred  and 
Eighth  Infantry  at  eight  fifty-five  quotes  "One  Hundred  and 
Eighth  Infantry  doing  well."  The  counter  barrage  went  chiefly 
over  the  heads  of  center  battalion,  who  suffered  only  few 
casualties.  At  eight  ten  the  regiment  was  reported  to  have 
passed  the  Hindenburg  Line  on  the  way  to  the  tunnel.  Opposi- 
tion encountered  was  not  very  strong  and  casualties  not  unduly 
severe. 

Eight  forty-five — A  telephone  message  said  that  wounded 
man  from  Company  I,  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry,  had 
been  told  that  the  trench  he  was  in  was  the  Hindenburg  Line. 
That  meant  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth  was  ahead  of  him  and 
the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  and  One  Hundred  and  Eighth 
must  have  been  well  ahead  of  the  Hindenburg  Line.  At 
6:30  A.  M.  the  Fifty-Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  had  been  seen 
entering  Bony  through  which  the  Hindenburg  Line  ran. 

The  strong  outpost  positions  were  in  the  locality  where  the 
heavy  casualties  were  most  numerous. 

Nine  A.  M. — A  message  reported  "Third  Battalion  of  One 
Hundred  an4  Eighth  Infantry  suffering  heavy  casualties  at 
Guillemont  Farm.  Ran  into  machine  guns  but  continued 
to  advance." 

Nine  five — An  officer  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry 
telephoned  that  he  had  been  wounded  in  the  arm  by  a  machine 
gun — that  he  had  practically  no  trouble  from  Boche  artillery 
but  that  machine  gun  fire  was  very  heavy. 

Ten  fifteen — The  following  was  received  at  Division  Head- 
quarters from  the  Fifty-Fourth  Infantry  Brigade.  "A  wound- 
ed officer  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  states  that 
casualties,  especially  officers,  were  heavy." 

Ope  p.  M- — A  message  was  received  from  the  Third  Aus- 
tralian Division  saying  that  the  Americans  were  leaderless 
near  Guillemont  Farm  and  Willow  Trench.  More  detailed 
reports  show  that  the  enemy  maintained  a  machine  gun  fire 
throughout  the  day  covering  the  whole  territory  of  the  ad- 


21 

vance.     Part  of  the  original  jumping-off  place  was  under  fire 
until  late  in  the  afternoon. 

The  report  of  operations  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  fire  was  strongest  on  the  extreme  left  and  extreme  right. 
The  report  says: 

"MOPPING  UP" 

"The  One  Hundred  and  Eighth  Regimental  Sector  Right 
Battalion  met  opposition  from  Quennemont  Farm.  Part  of 
this  battalion  passed  on  and  reached  the  Hindenburg  Line. 
A  detour  to  the  south  had  to  be  made  to  get  through  the  wire 
and  trenches.  One  hundred  and  fourteen  prisoners  were 
captured  and  trenches  mopped  up  toward  Bony." 

Mopping  up  is  the  term  the  soldiers  use  to  indicate 
driving  out  the  enemy  by  bayonet  and  hand  grenades.  The 
report  continues: 

"Patrols  sent  to  the  front  were  killed  by  enemy  sniper  and 
machine  gun  fire.  Enemy  several  times  counter-attacked  dur- 
ing the  day  by  bombing  from  the  direction  of  Bony,  but 
were  driven  off.  This  force  of  2  officers  and  100  men,  keeping 
in  subjection  their  prisoners  beat  off  all  counter-attacks  and 
maintained  their  position  on  the  Hindenburg  Line  throughout 
the  day  and  held  the  enemy  until  the  advance  of  the  Aus- 
tralian Corps  reached  them." 

The  remainder  of  the  Battalion  was  held  up  at  Querinemont 
Farm  and  vicinity  and  by  fire  from  Bony,  the  action  being  kept 
up  until  the  farm  was  finally  taken,  and  mopped  up.  The 
Australians  came  up  to  what  was  left  of  this  battalion  and  to- 
gether with  a  number  of  men  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighth, 
who  were  largely  leaderless,  made  a  small  advance  during 
the  afternoon. 

Part  of  the  Third  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighth 
Infantry  passed  Guillemont  Farm  and  was  held  up  by  fire  from 
Bony.  The  remainder  of  the  battalion  met  much  resistance 
from  Guillemont  Farm  and  vicinity. 

The  Third  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  In- 
fantry was  subjected  to  heavy  fire  from  the  start  and  advanced 
steadily  until  it  met  with  resistance  from  Lone  Tree  Trench  and 


22  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27TH  DIVISION 

Guillemont  Farm.  Part  of  this  battalion  passed  through  and 
formed  a  portion  of  the  force  later  described  as  passing  the 
Hindenburg  Line,  the  remainder  continuing  to  fight  where 
they  had  been  stopped  by  fire  from  Willow  and  Lone  Tree 
Trenches. 

BOCHE   AIRPLANE    BROUGHT   DOWN 

Near  Guillemont  Farm  a  German  airplane  was  brought  down 
by  Lewis  gun  and  rifle  fire.  At  this  point  6  of  our  officers  were 
killed  and  3  wounded,  including  the  battalion  commander  and 
adjutant. 

About  11:30  A.  M.  an  officer  went  about  300  yards  to  the 
rear  to  get  help  from  the  trench  mortars.  He  met  an  Aus- 
tralian tank  captain  who  consented  to  use  his  tanks  against 
the  Guillemont  Farm  fortifications,  but  all  the  tanks  were 
soon  destroyed  by  mines  or  shell  fire.  When  the  tanks  ap- 
proached, the  men  were  organized  into  small  groups  by  the 
two  surviving  officers  of  the  battalion  and  led  the  tanks. 
When  the  tanks  failed,  men  were  seen  retiring  to  the  trenches, 
but  retirement  was  stopped  here  and  the  men  prepared  to  hold 
the  trench.  In  a  few  minutes  they  were  reinforced  by  a 
company  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry.  In  half 
an  hour  the  combined  troops  went  forward  under  machine 
gun  fire  to  Willow  Trench,  where  they  were  soon  reinforced. 
The  enemy  repeated  its  attack  with  hand  grenades  several 
times  from  the  left,  but  our  men  killed  a  number  of  Boches  and 
the  attacks  were  driven  off.  About  6:30  P.  M.  the  combined 
troops  filtered  forward  on  the  left,  but  those  on  the  right  could 
not  do  so.  About  nine  thirty  in  the  evening  the  men  who 
went  forward  were  ordered  to  retire  to  Willow  Trench. 

The  First  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh 
Infantry  met  many  strong  enemy  machine  gun  nests  im- 
mediately after  leaving  the  starting  line.  As  long  as  the  men 
could  get  fairly  close  to  the  positions  and  rush  them  they  suc- 
ceeded in  advancing  in  spite  of  heavy  casualties.  On  reaching 
the  general  line,  however,  near  Willow  Trench  and  Knoll 
Trench,  they  were  stopped  by  heavy  machine  gun  fire.  The 
resistance  encountered  here  was  so  strong  that  the  major 


part  of  the  battalion  were  unable  to  advance,  but  certain 
squads  reached  the  Hindenburg  Line.  Tanks  were  unsuc- 
cessful here,  also,  as  in  other  places.  Several  of  them  at- 
tempted to  assist  the  line  forward  beyond  Willow  Trench  but 
were  disabled,  some  of  them  by  ground  mines.  However,  the 
positions  at  Willow  Trench  were  maintained  throughout  the 
day. 

ALL   COMPANY  OFFICERS    KILLED 

The  Second  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh 
Infantry  in  support  went  into  action  following  the  Third 
Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry,  going 
forward  and  taking  a  position  in  Willow  and  Guillemont 
Crescent  Trenches.  One  tank  accompanied  the  battalion. 
The  battalion  was  stopped  by  very  heavy  machine  gun  fire, 
both  from  the  north  and  from  the  front,  but  certain  groups 
managed  to  break  through  and  reach  the  Hindenburg  Line. 
Being  unable  to  go  forward  on  account  of  machine  gun  fire  they 
worked  their  way  back  to  Willow  Trench.  By  this  time  all 
officers  of  this  battalion  had  become  casualties.  The  position 
was  held  there  during  the  day  with  the  front  line  in  shell  holes, 
about  200  yards  west  of  Lone  Tree  and  Crescent  Trenches, 
with  an  advance  line  in  Willow  Trench  and  South  Guillemont 
Trench.  The  battalion  losses  were  45  killed,  298  wounded, 
and  35  missing. 

A  composite  battalion  made  up  of  surviving  units  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Sixth  Infantry,  composed  of  14  officers  and 
450  men,  advanced  in  the  rear  of  the  Third  Battalion  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry.  As  the  attacking  line  of 
the  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  was  held  up  in  the  vicinity  of 
Willow  Trench,  this  composite  battalion  caught  up  with  them 
and  entered  into  the  fight.  Out  of  the  14  officers  in  this  bat- 
talion, 9, including  the  commander,  were  killed  or  wounded. 

The  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry  was  assembled  in  the 
vicinity  of  Yak  Post  and  Lempire  Post.  The  leading  battalion, 
followed  by  the  other,  started  off  at  zero  hour  under  artillery 
formation,  but  was  delayed  fifteen  minutes  in  an  attempt  to 
secure  a  contact  with  the  troops  in  front.  The  leading 


24  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27TH  DIVISION 

Battalion  found  a  dense  smoke  screen  and  attempted  to  stop 
in  order  not  to  close  up  too  much  on  the  attacking  troops 
ahead.  The  Battalions  were  subjected  to  exceptionally  heavy 
machine  gun  fire  from  the  direction  of  the  Knoll  and  a  number 
of  casualties  were  caused  by  platoons  advancing  in  the  smoke 
and  running  into  this  machine  gun  fire. 

On  account  of  this  smoke  it  was  impossible  to  hold  all  the 
platoons,  some  of  which  continued  to  advance,  the  remainder 
taking  shelter  in  shell-holes.  After  reconnaissance,  the  line 
of  trench  running  north  from  Island  Travis  was  located  and 
the  Battalion  was  led  to  this  point.  Part  of  the  Second 
Battalion,  with  companies  of  the  other  Battalions,  advanced 
to  Willow  Trench.  When  the  smoke  screen  lifted  this  line 
was  reorganized  as  provisional  companies  and  consolidated. 

BOCHE  ADVANCES  FROM  VENDHUILLE 

Machine  gun  fire  was  very  active  from  the  direction  of 
Vendhuille,  which  marked  the  upper  boundary  of  the  Twenty- 
Seventh's  advance,  as  has  been  mentioned  in  previous  para- 
graphs. The  trenches  occupied  by  our  troops  actually  came 
so  close  to  the  Hindenburg  trench  system  that  only  a  mass  of 
barbed  wire  separated  them.  Near  Vendhuille  the  enemy  was 
observed  to  be  advancing  over  the  crest  of  a  hill.  Our  own 
machine  guns  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry  were 
employed  in  sweeping  the  crest  of  this  hill.  The  enemy  was 
seen  to  be  filtering  over  the  hill  and  working  down  into  Lone 
Tree  Trench.  By  the  use  of  hand  grenades  and  Lewis  guns, 
the  Boches  were  prevented  from  further  advance. 

The  First  and  Third  Battalions  of  the  One  Hundred  and 
Fifth  Infantry  followed  the  Second  Battalion,  but  in  the 
smoke  advanced  to  the  left  in  the  direction  of  the  Knoll. 
The  left  line  extended  north  of  the  divisional  boundary, 
meeting  some  British  troops  in  their  own  sector,  who  on 
account  of  the  smoke  had  also  extended  their  line  into  our 
sector.  Parts  of  the  leading  troops  advanced  to  the  east 
and  the  north  of  the  Knoll,  with  severe  casualties  from  the 
never  ceasing  fire  of  the  German  machine  guns.  What  was 
left  of  these  leading  units  filtrated  back  to  Knoll  Support  and 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  25 

Knoll  Trench,  where  the  support  companies  were  located. 
Small  groups  of  all  the  Battalions  in  this  left  regimental  sector 
advanced  in  the  smoke  between  the  machine  gun  nests  of 
the  enemy,  and  passed  through  the  Hindenburg  Line,  reaching 
the  line  in  the  canal,  including  part  of  Bony. 

The  experiences  of  these  groups  were  tragic  and  terrible. 
They  were  unable  to  maintain  the  position  and  were  without 
support,  and  consequently,  most  of  them  were  killed  or 
wounded.  Their  experience  was  very  much  the  same  as  that 
of  others  who  had  made  a  similar  dash  passing  the  Hindenburg 
Line. 

"OOZING  UP" 

When  the  attack  was  planned,  it  was  believed  that  the 
Boche  could  be  prevented  from  leaving  the  tunnel.  Instruc- 
tions given  to  our  men  prior  to  the  battle  contained  the  fol- 
lowing: "Measures  will  necessarily  have  to  be  taken  in  order 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  emerging  from  the  tunnel  in  rear  of 
our  men,  and  cutting  them  off."  It  was  not  through  any 
fault  of  those  who  planned  the  attack  or  those  who  executed  it 
that  this  could  not  be  prevented.  The  oozing  up  out  of  the 
tunnel  of  enemy  troops  coming  up  into  the  open,  like  ants  out 
of  an  ant  hill,  was  one  of  the  disagreeable  surprises  that  met 
our  men.  The  Boches  who  came  from  the  tunnel  were  able 
to  mount  their  machine  guns  and  do  deadly  damage  to  our 
men.  These  men  were  revenged,  however,  as  later,  other 
units  completely  mopped  up  the  tunnel,  and  almost  all  of 
these  Boche  machine  gunners  were  killed. 

At  eleven  o'clock  A.M.  the  line  was  held  approximately  as 
follows:  On  the  right  the  Second  Battalion  One  Hundred  and 
Eighth  Infantry  were  mopping  up  Quennemont  Farm.  The 
Third  Battalion  One  Hundred  and  Eighth  Infantry  had  parts 
of  two  companies  in  the  Hindenburg  Line  south  of  Bony. 
The  left  of  this  battalion  was  held  up  in  the  vicinity  of 
Guillemont  Farm.  The  Second  Battalion  One  Hundred  and 
Eighth  Infantry  was  occupying  a  position  in  their  support. 
The  Third  Battalion  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  with 
parts  of  the  combined  Battalion  of  the  One  Hundred  and 


26  THE  STORY  OF  THE  27TH  DIVISION 

Sixth  Infantry  held  a  position  on  the  western  edge  of  Guille- 
mont  Farm  in  Willow  Trench.  The  second  Battalion 
was  in  Willow  Trench  and  vicinity.  The  First  Battalion 
One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  was  intermingled 
with  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifth  Infantry  in  Willow 
Trench  and  Knoll  Trench.  The  Second  Battalion  One 
Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  was  somewhat-  to  the  left  of 
the  Third  Battalion  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  Infantry  in 
Willow  Trench.  The  One  Hundred  and1  Fifth  Infantry  was 
holding  the  line  on  Knoll  Trench  and  the  trenches  just  east  of 
the  crest  of  the  Knoll.  All  these  organizations  had  been  much 
depleted  on  account  of  heavy  casualties.  The  above  positions 
were  held  until  late  in  the  afternoon. 

A  counter-attack  by  the  enemy  forces  from  Vendhuille  and 
up  Macquincourt  valley  was  threatened,  as  numerous  enemy 
troops  were  seen  advancing,  but  the  attack  did  not  develop 
in  great  strength  owing  to  the  destructive  effect  of  our  field 
artillery  and  machine  gun  fire.  The  counter-attacks  were 
local  but  determined.  About  2  P.  M.  it  became  apparent 
that  there  was  a  shortage  of  officers  on  the  front  line  and  such 
officers  as  were  available  were  sent  to  organize  and  command 
the  detachments  which  had  been  driven  back  in  the  left  regi- 
mental sector.  About  4  P.  M.  it  was  decided  by  the  Division 
Commander  to  make  arrangements  for  the  night. 

LINE    HELD    NIGHT   OF    SEPTEMBER   29 

On  the  evening  of  the  twenty-ninth  the  line  ran  approxi- 
mately north  to  south,  as  follows:  Knoll  Trench,  with  outposts 
in  Knoll  Switch,  Willow  Trench,  on  the  west  edge  of  Guille- 
mont  Farm,  South  Guillemont  Trench,  Claymore  Trench, 
and  south  along  the  Hindenburg  Line. 

The  final  phase  of  the  taking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line  can  be 
described  in  a  few  words.  The  fighting  continued  long  after 
night  fall  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  September,  and  casualties 
were  reported  far  into  the  night. 

Under  an  arrangement  with  the  Third  Australian  Division, 
those  portions  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Division  which  were 
on  the  front  line  moved  forward  and  continued  to  attack 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  27 

throughout  Sept.  30,  and  with  hand  grenades  and  bayonets 
cleaned  up  the  third  line  of  trenches  of  the  Hindenburg  system 
opposite  our  sector,  captured  the  Hindenburg  Line  on  the 
left  regimental  sector,  taking  Eony,  which,  however,  was  not 
entirely  mopped  up  until  the  following  day.  The  tunnel 
was  taken  and  such  Germans  as  still  remained  in  it  were 
bayoneted  or  bombed  or  taken  prisoners.  Those  who 
were  captured  were  found  to  be  broken  in  spirit  and 
morale.  Airplane  observers  reported  the  areas  back  of  the 
tunnel  to  be  thick  with  retreating  Germans.  German  prison- 
ers in  innumerable  instances  when  examined  at  Headquarters 
told  of  their  dismay  at  having  lost  this  stronghold. 

OTHER    BATTLES 

In  spite  of  the  enormous  losses  sustained  by  the  Twenty- 
Seventh  Division  in  the  taking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  less 
than  three  weeks  later  it  participated  in  two  very  important 
battles,  that  of  La  Selle  River  and  the  Battle  of  Jonc-de-Mer 
Ridge,  both  of  which  cost  many  lives.  The  Battle  of  La 
Selle  River  took  place  on  October  seventeenth.  The  town 
of  St.  Souplet  was  captured  and  several  fortified  farms  were 
also  taken. 

In  the  Battle  of  La  Selle  River,  the  enemy  had  made  a 
determined  stand,  using  the  stream  as  a  defense.  The  Third 
British  Corps,  the  Ninth  British  Corps,  and  the  Tenth  French 
Army  participated  in  the  engagement,  as  they  had  done  in  the 
Battle  of  the  Hindenburg  Line.  It  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  in  all  these  battles  the  Thirtieth  American  Division  was 
at  the  south  of  the  Twenty-Seventh,  the  two  divisions  com- 
prising the  Second  American  Corps.  The  same  troops  par- 
ticipated in  the  Battle  of  Jonc-de-Mer  Ridge. 

Commenting  on  these  two  important  battles  following  so 
closely  on  the  Battle  of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  Major-Gen. 
O'Ryan,  in  a  bulletin  issued  at  Headquarters  on  October 
thirty-first,  said: 

"The  Division  Commander  cannot  withhold  this  expression 
of  his  admiration  and  respect  for  the  valor  and  discipline, 
as  well  as  the  endurance  and  spirit  manifested  by  officers  and 


28 

men  throughout  this  long  period  of  fighting.  These  sentiments 
are  stimulated  by  the  events  of  the  past  week.  When  re- 
duced in  numbers,  the  Division  attacked  the  enemy,  took  the 
town  of  St.  Souplet,  forced  the  crossing  of  the  La  Selle  River, 
and,  against  strong  opposition,  successfully  assaulted  the 
heights  on  the  other  side.  Since  that  date,  the  Division  has 
attacked  daily,  taking  by  force  the  town  of  Arbre  Guernon 
and  a  number  of  strongly  fortified  farms  and  forcing  a  with- 
drawal of  the  enemy  to  the  Canal  de  la  Sambre." 

On  October  nineteenth  and  twentieth,  the  day  following 
the  Battle  of  Jonc-de-Mer  Ridge,  the  Division  took  part  in 
an  engagement  on  St.  Maurice  River  in  the  vicinity  of 
Catillon,  France,  at  a  time  when  the  Infantry  strength  of  the 
Division  had  been  reduced  to  approximately  850  rifles. 
Against  heavy  attacks  by  enemy  machine  gun  nests,  together 
with  Infantry  and  Artillery  resistance,  an  advance  was  made 
to  the  line  of  the  St.  Maurice  stream,  and  the  enemy  driven 
back  to  the  Canal  de  la  Sambre. 

On  October  twenty-first,  the  Division  was  relieved  by  the 
British  and  moved  to  the  Corbie  area  for  rest. 

Previous  to  the  taking  of  the  Hindenburg  Line  the  Twenty- 
Seventh  Division  had  been  in  several  important  minor 
engagements. 

The  First  Units  of  the  Division  disembarked  at  Brest  and 
St.  Nazaire  from  May  twenty-third  to  May  thirty-first. 

On  June  fifth  the  Division  began  training  with  the  British 
in  Northern  France  under  the  Second,  Third,  and  Fourth 
British  Armies. 

ENGAGEMENTS  IN  BELGIUM 

On  July  ninth  it  made  a  very  significant  move  when  it  took 
over  from  the  Seventy-first  French  Division,  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  defense  of  the  East  Poperinghe  Line,  the  second 
line  of  the  defense  of  the  Dickebusch  and  Scherpenberg  sectors 
in  Belgium,  on  a  front  of  approximately  12,000  yards.  This 
was  at  the  time  when  the  Germans  were  planning  an  attack 
in  a  drive  through  to  the  sea.  It  was  expected  at  this  time 
that  the  armies  of  Prince  Rupprecht  of  Bavaria  would  make 


ITS  SACRIFICES  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  29 

an  attempt  at  such  a  drive.  The  drive,  however,  was  never 
made,  in  view  of  the  counter  attack  made  by  General  Foch 
on  the  Soissons-Rheims  sector  on  the  eighteenth  of  July. 

However,  the  Twenty-seventh  Division  participated  in 
minor  actions  in  the  Diekebusch  sector  on  August  twenty-third 
and  thirtieth,  repelling  raids,  making  raids  and  patrols,  facing 
enemy  machine  gun  fire.  On  August  thirty-first  the  Division 
fought  in  the  engagement  of  Vierstraat  Ridge.  The  engage- 
ment of  Vierstraat  Ridge,  was  an  advance  to  occupy  the 
Ridge  and  Mt.  Keminel  from  which  it  was  believed  the  enemy 
had  retired. 

The  enemy  was  found  to  be  withdrawing  his  main  force  to 
Wytschaete  Ridge  but  leaving  machine  gun  nests,  and  kept 
the  whole  terrain  covered  with  artillery  fire.  Our  troops  in 
their  advance  met  strong  resistance,  including  counter-attacks 
by  German  Infantry  as  far  as  the  East  slope  of  Vierstraat 
Ridge. 

The  Twenty-seventh  Divisional  Artillery  which  did  not  have 
any  part  in  the  foregoing,  played,  however,  a  very  important 
part  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive  in  support  of  the  Thirty- 
third  Division  and  Seventy-ninth  Division  in  various  opera- 
tions from  October  fourteenth  up  to  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
on  November  eleventh. 

TRIBUTE    BY   COMMANDER 

No  better  tribute  can  be  paid  by  a  commander  than  that 
found  in  a  statement  made  by  Major-General  John  F.  O'Ryan 
upon  his  arrival  in  New  York  on  Friday,  March  sixth,  in  which 
he  said: 

"I  am  happy  to  command  such  officers  and  men  as  compose 
this  division,  and  I  have  no  objection  to  speaking  of  them. 
In  fact,  I  welcome  the  opportunity  of  saying  a  word  or  two 
of  their  discipline,  valor  and  zeal.  When  I  speak  of  them,  I 
include  our  dead,  and  the  wounded  who  have  come  on  ahead 
of  us. 

"In  battle  our  men  performed  acts  of  valor  so  numerous, 
that  within  the  division  they  came  to  be  regarded  almost  as 
commonplace.  The  tributes,  however,  of  our  British  and 


3O  THE  STORY  OF  THE  2/TH  DIVISION 

Australian  comrades  who  witnessed  their  work  in  action,  and 
the  numerous  medals  and  citations  awarded  for  acts  of  extra- 
ordinary heroism,  furnish  a  better  appraisal  of  their  worth. 

"The  story  of  the  service  of  the  division  is  too  long  a  story 
to  do  more  than  to  refer  to  at  this  time,  but  I  am  sure  the 
families  of  our  soldiers  and  the  many  thousands  of  men  in 
New  York  State  who  have  served  in  the  years  gone  by  in  the 
old  regiments  of  the  division,  will  be  interested  to  know  that 
the  conduct  of  our  men  was  at  all  times  characterized  by  a 
remarkable  spirit — a  spirit  difficult  to  define,  but  which 
reached  in  battle  a  veritable  state  of  exaltation. 

"It  was  a  spirit  which  breathed  confidence,  determination 
and  willingness  to  make  any  sacrifice  to  win." 


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A     000  038  468     5 


t   been   started   four   or 
a/ro.     "If  it  had,"  he  said, 
.might  hare  been  saved  $400, 
;ver." 

r  man  facetiously  remarked 
were  possible    to    compare 
Mding  in  oil  stocks  with  its 
n  copper  stock,  it  would  be 
>at  the  city  might  more  prop- 
called  "The  Oil  City." 
lent  Barnard  stated  that  the 
^at  Stock  Committee  undoubt- 
ad   saved  Romans  $50,000  dur- 
•  past  year;  that  they  had  ab- 
•>roof  of     a     saving     of,  over 

position  of  an  industrial  in- 

'.net  with  the  approval  of  all 

as  did  a  Second  Mortgage 

projects  mentioned  were  the 
:ment  of  the  Floyd  road,  the 
x  street  bridge  over  the  Black 
Canal,    putting   a   silencer    or 
a  the  speech  of  the  taxi  drivers 
on  the     stand     on  Whitesboro 
so  that  women  in  the     hotel 
would  not  have  to  hear  a  c^n- 
s   stream   of  profanity,      r 
-'igns  directing  people  to  r 
hotel. 

member  explained  tha*. 
or  a  new  hotel  was  no  ' 
ne  people  who  are  o; 
in  Rome.    It  was  me 
he  part  of  Romans  t. 
ved    plant,    the    prc 
.rig  somewhat  out  r 
-  in  ths  matter  of 
'roof. 

Special  emphasi; 
iesirability      of 
matter  concerning  , 
able     supply  haviL 
some  time  ago. 

Those  present  were:  D.  S.  Ti:< 
Ivar  Ringdahl,  F.  M.  Shelley,  ( 
Simon,  H.  D.  Schilling,  A.  P.  ; 
F.  M.  Schneible,  H.  T.  MacCari,  / 
Lovier,  E.  D.  Bevitt  and  H.  W. 
nard. 


\ 


Lon§  head 

maKcs 
short  speecK 


v 


c  an  nxaKe 
Every  day  a  4< 


d  experience  we  have   £ 
he  Cryptic  rite. 

Masonry  is  not  a  steppin- 
•es,  but  attracts  those  intt 
iitions. 


tit 


DOROTHY  WILLIAMS 


FRANCES  BEHR 


EUGENIA  DOMINO 


Chopin 
KarganoJ} 

Padereivski 
Chopin 


It     (Pathetique)  Beethoven 

ve,  Allegro  di  motto  e  con  brio. 

10  cantabile. 
do',  Allegro. 

iarch  Beethoven-Rubinstein 

VIRGIL  C.  RAFFAUF 

S  of  Song  Mendelssohn-Liszt 

MafDo-ivel/ 

(In  the  Wood)  Staub 

v*  flat  Leschttizky 

LUELLA  GREENE 


.dicated  to  Mr.  Kno-iules) 
1T4x  H.   K NO \VLES 


John  Orth 


